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THE CASE OF THE BROBDINGNAGIAN LILLIPUTIAN: 
A SWIFTLY PENNED REPLY TO SHRADER 
Jack K. Horner 
In a recent illuminating and intriguing discussion 
in Auslegung1 of Reichenbach's theory of the interde-
pendence of physical causality? geometry and measuring 
conventions,2 Douglas Shrader invites us to consider 
the following passage: 
The metric of a space becomes an empirical 
fact only after the postulate of the dis-
appearance of universal forces is intro-
duced. Similarly, the topology of space 
becomes an empirical fact only if we add 
the postulate of the principle of action 
by contact.3 / 
This passage implies, Shrader contends, that in every 
physical situation Reichenbach claims that 
(R) We must set both the universal forces (F) 
and causal anomalies (A) equal to zero.1* 
In this note I would like to address the arguments Shrader 
presents in support of this assertion, urging that though 
instructive, none of them are cogent. 
First of all, it is not clear that the above passage 
implies (R). In the above context, it may well be that 
all Reichenbach desired to express by the juxtaposition 
of the two sentences composing that passage was a sort 
of convoluted, perhaps even distant, analogy between the 
relation of the metric of a space and universal forces 
on the one hand, and the relation between the topology 
of space and action by contact on the other. The passage 
thus need not address the question of whether we must 
simultaneously posit that F = 0 and A = 0 for all 
physical situations, contrary to what Shrader insists. 
Since it i s a maxim of philosophic methodology to extend 
that sympathy which extracts maximal cogency, I opt to 
give Reichenbach t h e benefit of the doubt. 
L e t us u n s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y s u p p o s e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
t h a t the above p a s s a g e i s i n t e n d e d t o be r e a d as i m p l y -
59 
ing (R). Now (R), Shrader claims, is perversely prob-
lematic. For we may imagine, he suggests, a schizo-
phrenic Gulliver adrift in a sea of concentric shells 
which collectively possess a very peculiar property. 
As Gulliver sails from shell 1 to shell 5 he finds 
them to be increasingly smaller, and, his log reports 
Not only is there a duplication of 
everything that . . . (I) left in 
shell 1, but since shell 5 is smaller, 
everything else is correspondingly 
smaller; . . . (I) am a giant in a 
world identical to the one . . . (I) 
just left. Upon returning to shell 1, 
. . . (my) friends tell . . . (me) of 
a similar giant who visited in . . . 
Cmy). absence and finally left looking 
quite dumbfounded. Wandering off in 
the other direction, (I find) the 
shells get increasingly larger till, 
in the fifth shell, . . . (I am) a 
dwarf in a world exactly like the 
other two.5 
In light of these experiences, Shrader claims, Gulliver 
has just two choices: either (a) he can posit that the 
geometry of space is Euclidean, and if so, he cannot 
also simultaneously posit normal causality and the 
absence of universal forces; or (b) he can hold that the 
geometry of space is non-Euclidean, say, toroidal, and 
if so, he cannot also hold simultaneously that there is 
normal causality and that there are no universal forces. 
In either case, Shrader concludes, (R) is just false. 
Since Gulliver's log is thus used to show that Reichen-
bach is not Swift in wit, the entry deserves our careful 
attention. 
(a). In case (a) an important asymmetry between 
Gulliver's log and that of his Reichenbachian cousin,6 
an explorer in a possibly toroidal world and a case 
whose analysis is previously accepted by Shrader, leaps 
from the page. Gulliver reports that sailing in 
direction 1 —» 5 he becomes a Brohdingnagian in the same 
world he left; while sailing in direction 5 —* 1 he 
dwindles to a Lilliputian in the same land. Gulliver's 
cousin, in contrast, notices no such changes in his 
relative size: 
He finds that in 5 everything is 
familiar to him . . . This 
correspondence manifests itself 
in every detail . . . .' 
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The similarity in every detail is crucial, for in the 
context of the example, it is a necessary condition of 
the identity of worlds. If the similarity were not 
exact, that is to say, then Gulliver's cousin would 
have empirical evidence licensing him to purge causal 
anomalies from his interpretation of experience by 
denying the identity of 1 and 5 while still maintain-
ing that there are no universal forces and that the 
geometry of space is Euclidean; in that case, however, 
the force of that essential example would be wholly 
destroyed. 
Analogously, in case (a) changes in size relative 
to Gulliver Cor his measuring rod) are sufficient to 
distinguish world 5 from world 1. The identity of 
worlds, furthermore, is a necessary condition for 
unambiguously positing causal anaomalies in Reichen-
bach' s terminology. For what Reichenbach means by 
'causal anomaly' is that the interdependence of all 
events at corresponding points does not "require time 
for transference" or does not "spread as a continuous 
effect that must pass consecutively through the inter-
mediate points" of a given space. 8 Hence Gulliver's 
log fails to satisfy a necessary condition for un-
ambiguously invoking the existence of 'causal anomalies'; 
the force of Shrader's counterexample is accordingly 
lost. 
(b). Let us suppose, on the other hand, that 
Gulliver accepts the identity of 1 and 5 and assumes 
that there are no causal anomalies and that the geometry 
of the world is non-Euclidean, say, toroidal. Then, 
Shrader claims, Gulliver will have to accept the presence 
of universal forces which increase his size and the size 
of his measuring rod relative to their environ when he 
s a i l s one d i r e c t i o n and d e c r e a s e s them when he sails the 
o t h e r ; i n s h o r t , i f G u l l i v e r assumes t o r o i d a l geometry 
and the identity of worlds, he cannot also simultaneously 
assume both A = 0 and F = 0, and once again (R) is false, 
R e i c h e n b a c h ' s r e s p o n s e t o t h i s a n a l y s i s would b e , 
in my j u d g m e n t , q u i t e d i r e c t . Every u n i v e r s a l f o r c e , 
he would insist, affects "all materials in the same way." 
And by this , Reichenbach would mean that there is no 
physical property, in this case size, which is differ-
e n t i a b l y affected. Hence the change in r e l a t i v e size 
Gulliver experiences cannot be the result of universal 
forces; he is still free, vis-a-vis Shrader's argument, 
to posit F = 0, though no doubt his physics would look 
r a t h e r s t r a n g e t o u s . 
If these considerations are sound, Gulliver's log 
does not meet Reichenbachian positing requirements: for 
on the one hand, (a) the very conditions under which it 
is possible to posit unambiguously causal anomalies are 
denied by that log; and on the other hand, (b) Gulliver* 
use of the term "universal force" does not satisfy 
Reichenbachian grammar. Indeed, the course Shrader 
would have us believe Gulliver sailed from Brobdingnag 
to Lilliput and back again was set dead against the 
winds of wisdom. 
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